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Summary
The developmental emphasis on improving wireless access security through various OSI PHY layer mechanisms
continues. This work investigates the exploitation of RF waveform features that are inherently unique to specific
devices and that may be used for reliable device classification (manufacturer, model, or serial number). Emission
classification is addressed here through detection, location, extraction, and exploitation of RF ‘fingerprints’ to
provide device-specific identification. The most critical step in this process is burst detection which occurs prior
to fingerprint extraction and classification. Previous variance trajectory (VT) work provided sensitivity analysis for
burst detection capability and highlighted the need for more robust processing at lower signal-to-noise ratio (SNR).
The work presented here introduces a dual-tree complex wavelet transform (DT-CWT) denoising process to augment
and improve VT detection capability. The new method’s performance is evaluated using the instantaneous amplitude
responses of experimentally collected 802.11a OFDM signals at various SNRs. The impact of detection error on
signal classification performance is then illustrated using extracted RF fingerprints and multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) with maximum likelihood (ML) classification. Relative to previous approaches, the DT-CWT augmented
process emerges as a better alternative at lower SNR and yields performance that is 34% closer (on average) to
‘perfect’ burst location estimation performance. Published in 2009 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEY WORDS: RF fingerprints; wavelet denoising; OFDM; 802.11a; dual tree wavelet transform
1. Introduction
Considerable research has been conducted on detecting
and/or mitigating spoofing within the medium
access control (MAC) layer of the open systems
interconnection (OSI) stack [1,2]. There has been a
recent shift toward providing added security at the
OSI Physical (PHY) layer by exploiting RF features
∗Correspondence to: Michael A. Temple, AFIT/ENG Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433,
U.S.A.†E-mail: michael.temple@afit.edu
‡The views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect official policy of the United States Air Force,
Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
§This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA.
that are inherently unique to a specific device and
that are difficult to replicate by an unintended party.
For example, some efforts have investigated received
signal strength (RSS) (a power-based metric) for
detecting and/or locating a spoofing node [1,2]. Both
of these efforts demonstrated some success at detecting
spoofing using experiments conducted with different
hardware and in different physical environments.
Published in 2009 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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RF fingerprinting is one alternative PHY layer
approach that is readily dismissed in Reference [2] for
‘scale’ reasons. For applications where size constraints
are less restrictive, RF fingerprinting remains a viable
alternative and is considered here as in previous works
[3,4]. Collectively, related works in RF fingerprinting,
electromagnetic signatures, intra-pulse modulation,
and unintentional modulation [5--13] form a solid basis
for developing techniques that may be applicable to
commercial communication devices. If the inherent RF
fingerprints are repeatedly extractable and sufficiently
unique, they are potentially useful for determining the
specific make, model, and/or serial number of a given
device.
Previous work highlighted signal structure unique-
ness and attributed inter-device differences to various
manufacturing, aging, and environmental factors
[5]. While several processing steps are required to
effectively exploit the unique RF fingerprints, burst
location is arguably the most important [8,10]. In this
context, burst location includes determining both the
burst start time and the subsequent signal region(s)
from which fingerprints are extracted. Both of these
factors are important given that improper selection
of either can unduly bias the processing to favor
channel noise effects or steady-state signal effects [5].
With the exception of more recent work in References
[3,4,14], these previous efforts lack a detailed
sensitivity analysis of burst detection and fingerprint
classification performance under varying channel noise
conditions.
Noise sensitivity analysis is imperative for deter-
mining the minimum acceptable signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) that provides consistent and reliable classifi-
cation results. This minimum acceptable SNR also
allows determination of maximum transmitter–receiver
separation distances which can aide in establishing
the geometric layout of physical hardware to improve
overall network security. Noise sensitivity performance
also provides a good discriminant for comparing
various detection and classification techniques. For the
work presented here, burst location performance is
conducted for a combined channel noise and burst-to-
burst variability effect using multiple 802.11a bursts
and multiple independent noise realizations for each
burst.
Related burst detection work in Reference [14]
provides preliminary results using variance trajectory
(VT) of 802.11a instantaneous amplitude response.
The choice of using OFDM-based signals for
demonstration, and in particular the 802.11a signal,
was driven by two factors, including (1) consistency
with previous related 802.11a work that has been
extensively published [3,4,14--17], and (2) the
continued emergence of OFDM-based signals as
envisioned for 3G/4G (IMT/IMT-Advanced) radio
communications. While the transient detection and
classification techniques used in this work are
likely applicable to other signal types, and may
actually perform better with some of them, the
challenges posed by OFDM-based signals must be
addressed.
The impact of burst detection error on signal
classification performance is addressed here using
RF fingerprints and multiple discriminant analysis
(MDA) with maximum likelihood (ML) classification.
While VT burst detection and MDA-ML classification
performance in earlier work [14] was shown to be
consistent with ‘perfect’ burst estimation performance
at higher SNRs in the range of 10 ≤ SNR ≤ 30 dB,
performance diverged at SNRs in the range of −3 ≤
SNR ≤ 10 dB. These previous results demonstrated
a margin for improvement only at the lower SNRs
and highlighted the need for a more robust technique,
providing the impetus for the work presented in this
paper. More specifically, a dual-tree complex wavelet
transform (DT-CWT) is introduced to denoise the
signal prior to VT calculation to improve performance
at lower SNRs (−3 ≤ SNR ≤ 10 dB). It is envisioned
that this technique would be activated only at the
operator’s discretion, since there is no gain at higher
SNRs.
2. Background
2.1. Signal Characteristics
Device emissions can be exploited using various signal
characteristics. However, instantaneous amplitude and
instantaneous phase characteristics are perhaps the
most extensively investigated [5,8--10]. More recently,
these two characteristics have been augmented with
instantaneous frequency and successfully exploited
for device classification [3,4,14]. The instantaneous
amplitude, a(k), instantaneous phase, θ(k), and
instantaneous frequency, f (k), responses of a complex
sampled signal s(k) are given by [18]
s(k) = i(k) + jq(k) (1)
a (k) =
√
i2 (k) + q2 (k) (2)
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θ (k) = tan−1
[
q (k)
i (k)
]
(3)
f (k) = 1
2π
φ(k) − φ(k − 1)
k
(4)
where i(k) and q(k) are the instantaneous in-phase and
quadrature-phase components of s(k).
2.2. Variance Trajectory (VT)
The work in Reference [8] analyzed Bluetooth
signals using the VT process with instantaneous
phase. The process windows an input signal and
calculates the signal variance for each window,
creating a variance vector. The difference between
consecutive variance values is calculated to form
the VT. The work presented here generates VT
sequence {VTa(i)} using instantaneous amplitude
sequence {a(k)}, k = 1, 2, . . . , Na, to estimate the burst
start. The ith element of sequence {VTa(i)} is given
by [3]
VTa(i) = |Wa(i) − Wa(i + 1)|
i = 1, 2, . . . , Lw − 1 (5)
Wa(m) = 1
Nw
1+(m−1)Ns+Nw∑
k=1+(m−1)Ns
[a(k) − µw]2
m = 1, 2, . . . , Lw (6)
where Nw is the window extent, and Ns is the
number of samples the window advances between
calculations. The µw factor in Equation (6) is the
sample mean of {aw(k)} which is the subsequence
of consecutive elements from {a(k)} contained in the
window. Figure 1 shows a representative amplitude
response and corresponding VT response for two
different analysis SNRs. As shown, there is a
distinct VT peak response corresponding to the
burst start which becomes less discernable as SNR
decreases.
2.3. Discrete Wavelet Transform Denoising
Signal denoising is accomplished using a discrete
Wavelet transform (DWT) by exploiting differences
in the distribution of signal burst energy and the
additive white gaussian noise (AWGN) in which it is
embedded. The noise channel is uniformly distributed
in the wavelet domain. Signal bursts, however, are
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Fig. 1. Instantaneous signal amplitude and corresponding VT
response for (a) SNR = 6 dB and (b) SNR = 0 dB.
non-uniformly distributed in the wavelet domain and
significant signal information manifests in the large
magnitude wavelet coefficients. It is common to
threshold the magnitude of the wavelet coefficients
in wavelet denoising applications where coefficients
larger than the threshold contain significant signal
contribution [19--28]. Those wavelet coefficients with
magnitude less than the threshold are understood to be
noise. Due to the compaction property of the wavelet
transform, there are relatively few large magnitude
coefficients.
One distinct disadvantage of the DWT is the
lack of shift invariance. i.e., if the signal is shifted
in time by some amount, the transformation of
that signal yields a different set of coefficients. In
the application addressed here, this problem has
the consequence of complicating the computation
of reasonable thresholds for signal denoising. This
problem is mitigated by using the DT-CWT
[29,30].
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Fig. 2. Representative dual-tree complex wavelet transform
(DT-CWT) structure [30].
2.4. Dual-tree Complex Wavelet Transform
The dual-tree complex wavelet transform (DT-CWT) is
a DWT extension that is nearly shift-invariant, i.e., the
DT-CWT coefficients are independent of time domain
shift and more strongly dependent on inter-scale and
intra-scale neighborhoods [29]. Furthermore, the DT-
CWT magnitude response exhibits reduced ringing
in the wavelet domain due to high-frequency noise
and sharp discontinuities, which make the denoising
algorithms more reliable. The DT-CWT is commonly
implemented as two real-valued filter banks as shown
in Figure 2.
For real-valued input signals, the Tree1 and
Tree2 filter banks yield real-valued coefficients
representing real and imaginary components of
complex coefficients, respectively [29]. For complex
input signals as used in this work, each filter bank yields
complex coefficients which are annotated as Tree1
and Tree2 for discussion. The scaling and wavelet
functions for Tree1 are symmetric (even functions)
while Tree2 has scaling and wavelet functions that
are anti-symmetric (odd functions). The wavelet and
scaling functions, ψ(t) and φ(t) respectively, for the
Tree1 filter bank are given by [29,30]
ψ(t) =
√
2
∑
n
h1(n)φ(2t − n) (7)
where
φ(t) =
√
2
∑
n
h0(n)φ(2t − n) (8)
Ideally, the corresponding functions for the Tree2
path are the Hilbert transforms of Equations (7) and
(8) and given by
ψ′(t) =
√
2
∑
n
h′1(n)φ
′(2t − n) (9)
where
φ′(t) =
√
2
∑
n
h′0(n)φ
′(2t − n) (10)
3. Methodology
3.1. DT-CWT Denoising
The process for denoising with the DT-CWT
is illustrated in Figure 3. The complex input
signal f (n) is transformed via the DT-CWT
(Section 2.4) producing two complex-valued sets
of wavelet coefficients, Tree1 and Tree2, one
from each filter bank. The two complex sets are
combined into one set of real-valued coefficients d(n)
according to
d(n) =
√
|Tree1(n)|2 + |Tree2(n)|2 (11)
The resultant d(n) coefficients from Equation (11) are
compared with threshold tdenoise and all coefficients
less than tdenoise are set to zero. That is, ∀n′ where
d(n′) < tdenoise, Tree1(n′) = 0 and Tree2(n′) = 0 and
the ‘punctured’ set of coefficients d′(n) produced.
The inverse DT-CWT (IDT-CWT) is then applied
to d′(n) to create the denoised complex signal
g(n). The denoised coefficients are subsequently
processed using the VT technique described in
Section 2.2 to generate Denoised VT results. Figure 4
shows representative amplitude and corresponding
VT responses for two different analysis SNRs of
a denoised signal. As compared to the Traditional
VT signal responses in Figure 1, there is a
more distinct peak associated with the burst start
at Time = 0 s.
Fig. 3. Illustration of DT-CWT denoising process.
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Fig. 4. Denoised instantaneous signal amplitude and
corresponding VT response for (a) SNR = 6 dB and (b)
SNR = 0 dB.
3.2. Overall Demonstration Process
The sequential burst detection, transient location, and
classification process are implemented relative to what
commonly occurs in an operational collection, i.e., a
real-time system samples the received signal, detects
the ‘presence’ of a burst, locates a given starting point
(sample number) within the burst turn-on transient
region, and classifies the burst using specific extracted
features. If a burst is received and its ‘presence’ not
declared, it is an undetected burst. If a burst is received
and its ‘presence’ declared, it is a detected burst.
The focus of this work is on detected bursts with
subsequent algorithmic processing used for transient
location. For those cases where the transient location
algorithm does not converge in accordance with
prescribed criteria (number of iterations, parametric
tolerance, etc.), the detected bursts are designated as
‘non-convergent’ and a default transient location value
assigned. When algorithm convergence occurs, the
bursts are designated as ‘convergent’ and the estimated
location assigned. When algorithm convergence occurs
for identical bursts with both location techniques, the
bursts are designated as ‘dual convergent’ bursts. This
operational methodology is implemented here using a
four step process comprised of: (1) burst detection, (2)
burst start location, (3) RF fingerprint extraction, and
(4) device classification.
(1) Step 1---burst detection: The first step represents
coarse burst detection. This step monitors the RF
environment to detect the presence of RF bursts.
The received signal is segmented into a consecutive
series of subsections using relatively wide, non-
overlapping windows, Ns = Nw from Equation
(6). While not a requirement, non-overlapping
windows are used to minimize processing time.
This has the disadvantage of producing coarser
estimates of where the actual burst response starts,
while at the same time capturing more signal power
within each window and improving detectability.
For all results presented in this paper, a window
size of Nw = 512 signal samples (21.6 s) is used
for Step 1.
The two burst detection methods (VT and
Denoised VT as described previously in Sections
2.2 and 3.1, respectively) are applied to the
windowed signal data and an a priori threshold
tdetect used to declare detection. Once detection
occurs, the corresponding segment of windowed
signal data is passed to Step 2 where it is assumed
that an actual burst start occurs within the window.
However, as with all signal detection approaches
false alarms can occur with bursts falsely declared
present. Results of a performance comparison
between the two detection methods for this step
are provided in Section 4.1.
(2) Step 2---burst start location: This step is similar
to Step 1 in that the two detection methods
are reapplied. However, the objective here is to
accurately and precisely locate the time at which
an abrupt change occurs in the VTa response of
Equation (5). The effectiveness of this approach is
based on the implicit assumption that the 802.11a
OFDM signal can be modeled as having a step
change response in the burst transient region.
This assumed response is consistent with 802.11a
specifications [31] and has been successfully
exploited in change point estimation research
[15--17].
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The segment of windowed data passed from
Step 1 is further sub-segmented using much
narrower and highly overlapped windows. The
overlapping windows allow for better location
accuracy at the expense of increased processing
time. For this work, a window size of Nw = 20
samples (0.84 s) is used with a shift of Ns = 2
samples (84.2 ns) between consecutive windows.
A different a priori detection threshold tlocate
(compared to Step 1) is used to automatically
estimate the burst start location based on a
significant peak response occurring in VTa(i) of
Equation (5).
If a significant peak is located, the signal is
passed to Step 3. It is possible that no significant
peak is found and the algorithm therefore does not
converge to a solution. This could be the case if
Step 1 passed along a false alarm and no signal
burst is present or if the threshold is just too
high for that particular burst. When this happens,
there are two options available: the signal can
be discarded or a default start location can be
assigned. In an operational environment, where
the algorithm has exposure to numerous bursts,
discarding signals may be a good choice. However,
for this work, the probability of detect in Step 1 is
100%, since the data is manually extracted from
the RF environment. With that assumption and
the limited amount of data to process, a default
location is assigned to those signals which had no
significant peak. As per Section 3.2, these bursts
are denoted as ‘non-convergent’ bursts. The default
location is chosen to be the last sample number
of the window. Only those bursts that converge
to a solution are used in remaining steps and are
denoted as ‘convergent’ bursts. A performance
comparison for this step between the two methods
is documented in Section 4.2.
(3) Step 3---RF fingerprint extraction: After locating
the burst start, statistical waveform feature data
is extracted from the next 16.0 s of the burst to
represent the RF Fingerprint. This 16.0 s region of
the burst corresponds to the 802.11a preamble [31].
More specifically, statistics are calculated for the
three instantaneous waveform characteristics given
by Equations (2), (3), and (4) across three distinct
regions within the 16.0 s preamble, including
the short symbol region, the long symbol region,
and the combined short-long symbol region (entire
preamble). The three statistical features considered
for this work include the variance, skewness, and
kurtosis.
As a result of this process, the RF fingerprint
(feature vector) used for device classification
consists of 27 features per burst (3 preamble re-
gions × 3 waveform characteristics × 3 statistics).
After RF fingerprints have been extracted from
each detected burst, the feature vectors are passed
to Step 4.
(4) Step 4---device classification: The impact of detec-
tion error on signal classification performance is
illustrated using the extracted RF fingerprints from
Step 3 and MDA with ML classification. MDA
is an extension of Fisher’s Linear Discriminant
(FLD) process for more than two classes [32].
Classification is demonstrated here using an MDA-
ML process [33]. For the 3-class problem, the
MDA process projects higher-dimensional data
onto a two-dimensional ‘Fisher plane’ that max-
imizes inter-class distances while simultaneously
minimizing intra-class distances. In principle, this
method cannot improve classification potential.
However, it provides good class separation and
visualization of data having dimensionality greater
than 3. Using this lower-dimensional data, ML
decision boundaries are determined assuming
normally distributed input data, equal costs or risk,
and uniform prior probabilities. To discriminate c
classes using d-dimensional input data, the input
vector x is linearly projected onto a (c − 1)-
dimensional space using
y = Wtx (12)
where y is the vector of projected values and W
is a d × (c − 1) projection matrix. Classification
is performed using unknown data and the two-
dimensional trained decision boundaries. The
process classifies each unknown input data
set by projecting it onto the trained ‘Fisher
plane’ using Equation (12). Projected points
falling within the correct region are correctly
classified while those falling outside the correct
region are misclassified. The percentage of
correct classification is determined based on the
total number of unknown trials. A performance
comparison for this step between the two methods
is documented in Section 4.3.
3.3. Data Collection and Noise Simulation
The process for collecting 802.11a signals is shown
in Figure 5. The Agilent-based RF Signal Intercept
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Fig. 5. Process for RFSICS 802.11a signal collection and
post-collection processing, to include noise generation,
digital filtering, and scaling for desired analysis SNR.
and Collection System (RFSICS) was used to
collect approximately 200 bursts from three different
802.11a devices. For all collections, the devices
under test and RFSICS were co-located in a
typical wireless office environment, i.e., a room
containing 20–25 active workstations with various
wireless peripherals, personnel with wireless personal
communication devices, a wireless network access
node, composite cubicle partitions, metal book cases,
metal filing cabinets, etc. As such, all collected
signals inherently include the desired line-of-sight
(LOS) signal component as well as in-band interfering
components commonly found in such an environment,
e.g., non-LOS multipath, intra-system multiple access,
inter-system coexistence, etc.
Basic functionality of the RFSICS is provided by
Agilent’s E3238S system [34]. This includes an RF
front-end collection range of 20.0 MHz to 6.0 GHz
from which a band of interest is selected using a tunable
RF filter with fixed bandwidth of 36.0 MHz. The
selected RF band is down-converted to an intermediate
frequency (IF) of 70.0 MHz and passed to a digitizer.
The digitizing process consists of down-conversion
(near baseband), 12-bit analog-to-digital conversion
at 95 M samples-per-second (SPS), digital filtering
(user defined bandwidth), Nyquist compliant sub-
sampling, and data storage as complex in-phase (I) and
quadrature (Q) components. A digital filter bandwidth
of 18.56 MHz was selected for all 802.11a signals
collected for this work. This resulted in the RFSICS
automatically applying a sub-sampling factor of 4,
for a final sample rate of fs = 23.75 MSPS and
corresponding sample interval of Ts = 1/fs ≈ 42.1 ns
per sample.
The near-baseband RFSICS data were further post-
processed in a MATLAB environment with each burst
visually analyzed to accurately identify the sample
number corresponding to the burst start. Starting
from this sample number, a sufficiently long portion
of the signal is extracted to capture the 802.11a
preamble response and a small portion of pseudo-
randomly modulated data. The extracted burst response
is then normalized to equal power with respect to the
other collected bursts. Next, the bursts responses are
digitally filtered and their power at the filter output
is calculated. A 6th-order baseband Chebyshev digital
filter was used with a −3 dB bandwidth of 9.2 MHz.
At this point, the final baseband signals used for
burst detection, transient location, and classification
are sampled at frequency of fs = 23.75 MSPS and are
effectively oversampled by a factor of approximately
1.3 times Nyquist. The typical collected SNR at this
point in the process is on the order of SNR = 40 dB.
Provided that RFSICS collection and subsequent post-
processing is identical for all signals, it is reasonable to
assume that ‘coloration’ (variation in amplitude, phase
and/or frequency characteristics) induced prior to burst
detection, transient location, and burst classification
is approximately identical as well. This is important
in the overall process and ensures that final results
are based on ‘as received’ signal characteristics and
features versus being unduly influenced by signal-
dependent collection and post-processing coloration.
To simulate varying SNR conditions, like-filtered noise
is added prior to analysis. This is done by generating
random complex AWGN that is filtered using the
same digital filter as used for the signal. The filtered
noise power is then calculated and used to scale the
filtered AWGN to achieve the appropriate analysis SNR
when added to the filtered signal. A representative
802.11a RF burst is shown in Figure 6 at the
collected SNR and analysis SNRs of SNR = 10 dB and
SNR = 0 dB.
3.4. Threshold Determination
Three distinct threshold values are required, one each
for burst detection, burst location, and denoising
when the Denoised VT process is employed. All
SNR-dependent threshold values are determined a
priori based on noise-only analysis using 100 000
AWGN realization. When evaluating the Denoised VT
technique, the DT-CWT denoising threshold tdenoise in
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Fig. 6. Instantaneous amplitude: (Top) collected signal,
(Middle) filtered signal-plus-AWGN at SNR = 10 dB, and
(Bottom) filtered signal-plus-AWGN at SNR = 0 dB.
Section 3.1 is established using random realizations of
noise that are generated, filtered, scaled (for appropriate
SNR), DT-CWT transformed and coefficients retained
for threshold determination. The remaining burst
detection threshold (tdetect) and burst location threshold
(tlocate) are determined using a similar noise-only
analysis with appropriate window parameters for the
given technique. In all cases, results from 100 000
iterations are histogrammed and the threshold value
empirically chosen.
The DT-CWT denoising threshold value (tdenoise) is
empirically chosen and corresponds to the histogram
bin value below which 95% of the noise-only values
occur. The burst detection threshold value (tdetect)
is chosen using conventional noise-only analysis of
probability of false alarm (Pfa) and probability of
detection (Pd) as represented on a receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve. Results of this analysis are
reported in Section 4.1.
The burst start location threshold value (tlocate) is
chosen such that there is a trade-off between the number
of early burst location estimates (Time < 0 s) versus
the number of algorithm non-convergent solutions.
The actual values chosen were selected to ensure that
both of these conditions are present and observable
in the data. When comparing the Traditional VT and
Denoised VT processes, the threshold is constrained
to provide a similar number of early locates (10%) for
both techniques to illicit a more fair comparison.
4. Results
Burst detection, burst start location, and device
classification results are presented for both the
Traditional VT and Denoised VT techniques for −3 ≤
SNR ≤ 10 dB.
4.1. Burst Detection
ROC curves were calculated as described in Step 2
of Section 3.2 to characterize performance differences
between the two burst detection techniques. Results in
Figure 7 show that at both SNR = 6 dB and SNR =
0 dB, the Denoised VT technique provides a higher
probability of detection (Pd) for a given probability of
false alarm (Pfa). With a higher Pd for a given Pfa, the
Denoised VT technique passes more bursts to the next
step when compared with Traditional VT. With more
bursts passing, it is possible to correctly classify the
device in less time and have a higher confidence in the
classification.
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Fig. 7. Probability of false alarm (Pfa) versus probability of
detection (Pd) ROC curves for Traditional VT and Denoised
VT techniques at (a) SNR = 6 dB and (b) SNR = 0 dB.
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4.2. Burst Location
To isolate the effects of burst location accuracy from
burst detection error, the RF bursts were manually
detected prior to burst location analysis. Thus, there
is no noise-only data input to this process to generate
false alarms and Pd = 100%. Plots in this section share
two common attributes, including (1) the correct burst
locations occur at Time = 0 s and (2) the default non-
convergent solutions occur at Time = 1.5 s (see Step
2 of Section 3.2). For all −3 ≤ SNR ≤ 10 dB, the
Denoised VT technique outperforms the Traditional
VT technique by maintaining a more precise and
accurate burst start location estimate while converging
to a solution more often (fewer non-convergent
solutions).
These results illustrate the combined effects of noise
and burst-to-burst signal variability. In this case, 500
AWGN realizations were scaled for each SNR and
added to each of the 200 collected bursts—a total of
100 000 unique AWGN realizations per SNR. Results
for Traditional VT and Denoised VT estimation are
shown in Figure 8. Analysis of these results indicates
that the Denoised VT technique outperforms the
Traditional VT technique by (1) correctly locating
74.7% more of the burst start locations while (2)
experiencing 30.2% fewer non-convergent solutions,
i.e., fewer estimated starts at the default value of
Error = 1.5 s.
In an operational implementation, only those bursts
causing location convergence according to Step 2 of
Section 3.2 would be used for further processing.
Therefore, for comparing classification performance
of the two techniques this research only used bursts
that resulted in a converged location solution with
both techniques. As per Section 3.2, these bursts are
denoted as being ‘dual convergent’. All other bursts
that resulted in a converged location solution with
only one of the two technique are excluded from
subsequent classification given they could unduly bias
results towards the technique having more converged
solutions. The burst start location error probability
distribution for ‘dual convergent’ bursts is shown in
Figure 9 for two analysis SNRs. The distribution
differences (and their associated ‘fingerprints’) account
for the only differences between the two techniques
being processed by the classifier.
4.3. Burst Classification
A total of 200 802.11a bursts were collected from
three different devices and used to demonstrate the
Fig. 8. Burst location histograms showing impact of
Combined variation across bursts and AWGN realizations
using 200 bursts and 500 independent noise realizations.
Non-convergent algorithm solutions located at default value
of Error = 1.5 s. (a) Traditional VT and (b) Denoised VT.
impact of burst estimation on MDA-ML classification
performance. The multi-dimensional MDA-ML input
data represents the signal ‘fingerprint’ which consists
of variance, kurtosis, and skewness statistics calculated
over the instantaneous amplitude, instantaneous
frequency, and instantaneous phase responses of the
802.11a preamble region.
A K-fold cross validation and Monte Carlo process
was used to ensure statistical significance in simulated
results. While the actual required value of K to
produce validated results can vary as a function of
data ‘behavior’, the values of K = 5 and K = 10 are
common choices for K-fold cross validation [35]. As
an example, for 200 ‘dual convergent’ bursts per device
with K = 5 cross validation, the input data set is
partitioned into five equal subsets (40 bursts each),
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Fig. 9. Burst location error probability for distribution for
‘dual convergent’ bursts: (a) SNR = 6 dB and (b) SNR =
0 dB.
with four subsets (160 bursts) used for training and
the remaining ‘held out’ subset (40 bursts) used for
classification [35].
The overall K-fold cross validation and Monte Carlo
simulation process included (1) generating, filtering,
and scaling AWGN to achieve the desired SNR; (2)
estimating the burst start location using the method
being evaluated; (3) determining which bursts are
‘dual convergent’, as per Section 4.2, and determining
the minimum ‘dual convergent’ bursts for the three
devices to ensure an equal number of samples for
each device; (4) generating projection matrix W as
per Step 4 of Section 3.2 using the first 80% ‘dual
convergent’ bursts from each device for training
the projection matrix W for MDA and computing
the parameters for the likelihoods used for the ML
classifier; (5) transforming the remaining 20% ‘dual
convergent’ bursts from each device as ‘unknown’
input data using W and classifying each per ML
criteria; (6) storing/accumulating classification results;
(7) circularly shifting (re-ordering) the collected bursts
by 20%; (8) repeating Step 4 through Step 7 a total
of four more times; (9) repeating Step 1 through Step
8 a total of 500 times using different independent
AWGN realizations for each iteration; (10) averaging
accumulated classification results from Step 6 to obtain
overall classification performance.
A similar process was used in Reference [14]
to show that MDA-ML classification performance
with Traditional VT location estimation approaches
that of Perfect location estimation for 10 ≤ SNR ≤
30 dB, with notably poorer performance achieved for
−3 ≤ SNR ≤ 10 dB. Therefore, this work specifically
proposes the use of denoising in the lower SNR region
where performance improvement is realizable. This
is done by iteratively applying the above process for
−3 ≤ SNR ≤ 10 dB in 1.0 dB steps. In practice, the
decision on whether or not to employ denoising could
be based on SNR estimates.
Results in Figure 10 shows average MDA-ML
classification performance including burst detection
error effects for Perfect, Traditional VT, and Denoised
VT burst detection methods. In this case, ‘Perfect’
results were obtained using a manual burst detection
and location process based on visual inspection of
instantaneous amplitude responses from each burst.
As shown, the Perfect results provide an upper
bound on achievable performance. Results for the VT
and Denoised VT methods are similar for SNR >
6 dB and SNR < −2 dB. For −1 < SNR < 5 dB, the
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Fig. 10. Average MDA-ML classification accuracy for ‘dual
convergent’ bursts including burst detection error effects for
various burst detection methods.
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Table I. MDA/ML classification confusion matrix for various burst
detection methods at SNR = 3 dB.
Class estimate
Input class A B C
Perfect
A 68% 21% 11%
B 31% 44% 25%
C 14% 17% 69%
Traditional VT
A 67% 22% 11%
B 31% 42% 27%
C 22% 21% 57%
Denoised VT
A 67% 21% 12%
B 30% 43% 27%
C 18% 19% 63%
Denoised VT technique outperforms the Traditional
VT technique and provides an average improvement
in classification accuracy of 1.75%, which is a
34% improvement towards the Perfect case upper
bound.
Classification performance is commonly illustrated
using a confusion matrix that shows the percentage
of time a particular input class is estimated as one
of the possible classes, with the bold diagonal entries
representing correct classification performance for a
given device. Classification results for the SNR =
3 dB data points in Figure 10 are shown in Table I.
As indicated in the table, the greatest improvement
that Denoised VT provided when compared with
Traditional VT is in correctly classifying Class C.
Comparing Perfect to Traditional VT, there is only a
1–2% margin for improvement in correctly classifying
Class A and Class B, respectively. However, there is a
12% margin for improvement for Class C. Here, the
Denoised VT provides a 6% gain which represents a
50% improvement towards achieving Perfect transient
location performance.
5. Conclusion
Previous work provided noise sensitivity analysis for
VT burst detection and highlighted the need for more
robust processing at lower SNRs. A new technique is
presented here that uses a DT-CWT to denoise signals
and improve overall VT capability. Instantaneous
amplitude responses from collected 802.11a signals
were used to demonstrate performance of the Denoised
VT technique at varying SNR. As implemented with
DT-CWT processing, the Denoised VT technique
outperforms the Traditional VT technique in all areas,
including burst detection, burst start location, and
device classification. For burst detection, the denoising
technique provides more positive detections for a
given false alarm rate. For burst start location, the
denoising technique is 74.7% more precise in finding
burst start locations and experiences 30.2% fewer
non-convergent solutions. Finally, device classification
performance was demonstrated using extracted RF
fingerprints and MDA with ML classification. Relative
to the Traditional VT technique, the Denoised VT
process emerges as a better alternative at lower
SNRs and yields a classification performance increase
of 1.75% (on average) or a 34% improvement
towards achieving ‘perfect’ burst location estimation
performance.
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